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INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION REVISED:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
REVISIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS




N recent years, the number of investor-state arbitrations-adminis-
tered by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID), an arbitral institution affiliated with the World Bank,'
or under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Rules 2-has increased dramatically, resulting in a growing
body of international investment law. This growth is largely the result of
the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 3 and free trade
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1. ICSID's founding document is the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. It is best known as
the "Washington Convention" or the "ICSID Convention." Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention];
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID] Convention,
Regulations and Rules, Apr. 10, 2006, ICSID/15, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules].
2. In 1976, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL) issued the Model International Commercial Arbitration Rules. United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbitration
Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17
(Dec. 15, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules].
3. BITs became common during the 1980s and 1990s as a means of encouraging capi-
tal investment in developing markets. Many BITs contain provisions dealing with
the enforceability of international arbitration agreements. In addition, some BITs(including the US Model BIT) obligate a host state, at the request of the investor,
to submit investment disputes to binding third-party arbitration. As of June 2006
there were 2,506 BITs worldwide. U.N. Conference on Trade & Development,
International Investment Rule-Setting: Trends, Emerging Issues and Implications, at
3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TD/B/COM.2/73 (Jan. 5. 2007).
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agreements (FTAs) at the bilateral, regional, and interregional levels,
which allow private investors to resort to arbitration to protect their com-
mercial interests against measures adopted by states in their sovereign
capacity. Generally, investors may choose one of the following options as
the basis for their investor-state arbitrations: the ICSID Convention,
where both the respondent state and the claimant investor's home state
have ratified the Convention; ICSID's Additional Facility Rules, 4 where
either, but not both, the claimant's home state or respondent state has
ratified the ICSID Convention; or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Indeed, "of the 2,300-odd [BITs] now in existence, more than 1,500 pro-
vide for arbitration administered by [ICSID]."15 Also, of the over 219
known investor-state arbitrations so far, about 30 percent have used the
UNCITRAL Rules.6
Additionally, private investors have demonstrated an increased willing-
ness to rely on international investment agreements to resolve trans-
border disputes. Indeed, after a slow start, ICSID's facilities are better
known in the international business community and used with greater fre-
quency, especially following the financial crisis in Argentina, which sent a
large number of cases to ICSID arbitration.7
The rapid expansion in ICSID's caseload, however, has not produced a
concomitant increase in manpower or change in governing structure. In-
deed, ICSID remains small, staffed by about a dozen lawyers, with the
general counsel of the World Bank serving as its de facto part-time Secre-
tary-General.8 Consequently, ICSID has struggled to maintain an effi-
cient, highly technical investor-state arbitration process. Commentators
question whether ICSID "has the financial backing, governmental sup-
port and 'ICSID-arbitration focused' senior management required to ful-
fill its growing responsibilities." 9
Likewise, the UNCITRAL Rules, which have been in force since their
adoption by UNCITRAL and the United Nations General Assembly in
1976, were not specifically tailored to resolve investor-state disputes or
4. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Apr. 10, 2006, ICSID/11, http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/facility/facility.htm, [hereinafter ICSID Additional Facility Rules].
5. William Rowley QC, ICSID at a Crossroads, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 1 (2006).
6. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES: A REVIEW at 5, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/
4, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.1 (Feb. 1, 2006) (published as part of the UNCTAD
Series on International Investment Policies for Development).
7. Argentina is currently named as respondent in twenty-nine pending ICSID arbitra-
tions resulting from the government's 2002 emergency monetary policy freezing
local tariffs and abolishing U.S. dollar-to-peso convertibility. ICSID, ICSID
Cases, Introduction, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited
Sept. 18, 2007).
8. See Rowley, supra note 5, at 2. Realistically, the responsibilities of the general
counsel of the World Bank preclude the holder of that office from focusing exclu-
sively on the responsibilities of the ICSID Secretary-General. These responsibili-
ties include among others, the screening of requests to commence arbitral
proceedings and the authority to appoint the presiding arbitrator in cases where
the parties cannot agree.
9. Id. at 1.
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entertain claims for breach of customary or conventional international
law.10 Indeed, from a procedural perspective, disputes to which a state is
a party involve questions of law or public interest that are distinct from
an arbitration between private commercial parties. This fundamental dif-
ference between state and commercial arbitrations has direct implications
for the conduct of the arbitration. For example, there may be a need for
particular procedural arrangements, such as separate phases on jurisdic-
tion and admissibility before the submission of a statement of claim, ami-
cus curiae briefs, and consolidation of claims and hearings. 1 Although
some BITs empower arbitral tribunals to amend the UNCITRAL Rules
as necessary or directly set forth particular procedures derived from or
supplementing the Rules, under the vast majority of BITs, parties and
tribunals have to look for guidance outside the text of the UNCITRAL
Rules in relation to such issues. 12
Both ICSID and UNCITRAL, therefore, have implemented or are in
the process of implementing, reforms to their rules in an effort to address
modern arbitral realities and ensure their continued relevance in the field
of international arbitration. The purpose of this article is to present a
comprehensive re-examination of the ICSID and UNICITRAL arbitra-
tion rules both from an academic perspective and as a matter of practice
and procedure.
Part I of this article will first briefly consider ICSID's history and pur-
pose, highlight some basic provisions, and examine ICSID's limited juris-
dictional scope. Second, ICSID's revised rules will be discussed in detail,
article by article, with the old rules as a basis for comparison. "The IC-
SID rule changes are intended to make ICSID proceedings more stream-
lined and transparent, while instilling greater confidence in the arbitral
process. ' ' 13 Although "[t]he real effect of these reforms on investor-State
arbitration will depend on how they are implemented in practice," "the
changes ... reflect a growing trend in investor-State arbitration towards
increased transparency and public participation, and a greater willingness
to draw inspiration from litigation-based models of dispute resolution.' 14
Third, notwithstanding ICSID's application of the new rules to arbitra-
tions effective April 10, 2006, several challenges to ICSID's continued
relevance remain. Indeed, the ICSID reforms
are ... noteworthy for what they do not include: a new appeals pro-
cess. In October 2004, ICSID proposed a mechanism for appealing
ICSID awards, but later abandoned the idea in the face of mounting
10. Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules refers only to "disputes in relation to [a]
contract." See UNCITRAL Rules, art. 1(1), supra note 2.
11. JAN PAULSSON & GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, REVISION OF THE UNCITRAL ARBI-
TRATION RULES 10, (2006), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules-re-
port.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Report].
12. Id.
13. GARY BORN ET AL., INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: ICSID AMENDS INVES-
TOR-STATE ARBITRATION RULES, (WilmerHale 2006), http://www.wilmerhale.
corn/publications (search author "Born").
14. Id.
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criticism. The debate over whether to create an appellate mecha-
nism for ICSID awards may be revisited in the future. 15
That will be when contracting states begin to lose more disputes, and par-
ticularly lose disputes that they believe were wrongly decided.16 For now,
however, ICSID's existing annulment procedure will provide the only
grounds for review of arbitral awards.
Also, the effectiveness of the method for enforcing awards under IC-
SID will be compared to the mechanism provided under the New York
Convention, which is used to enforce the awards of ICSID's main com-
petitor, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which has an In-
ternational court of arbitration. 17 If ICSID's enforcement mechanism is
inadequate, then a successful claim before an arbitral tribunal could lose
its financial significance. Accordingly, special consideration is given to
the status of international arbitration in Latin America since
a significant portion of ICSID's total caseload, . . . 49 percent of
pending [cases] -. . . concern[s] claims against states in the Americas.
None of the cases filed during ICSID's first 30 years was against a
Latin American sovereign, but since 1996 there have been 40 cases
filed against Argentina, seven against Ecuador, six against Vene-
zuela, four against Peru, three against Chile, two against Bolivia, and
one each against Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and
Paraguay. (Brazil has never consented to using the ICSID frame-
work for disputes with foreign investors, and Mexico has consented
only for NAFTA claims by US or Canadian investors, as discussed
below). In most cases, the claimants have been investors from indus-
trialised nations in Europe or the United States. But recently,...
15. Id.
16. Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is The Desire for Accu-
racy Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 444 (2006).
17. See N. Brower & Michael Tupman, Court-Ordered Provisional Measures Under the
New York Convention, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 34 (1986). The ICC, founded in 1919,
is one of the world's leading international commercial arbitration institutions. In-
deed, its annual caseload was well above 300 cases per year during the 1980s and
early 1990s, and now it exceeds 500 cases per year. ICC, 18 INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN (issue no.1). "In 2005 alone, 521 cases were
filed, involving 1,422 parties from 117 countries." HG.org, Worldwide Legal Direc-
tories, Arbitration, http://www.hg.org/arbitration.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
The ICC has promulgated the ICC Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules) as well as the
ICC Rules of Optional Conciliation. Under the ICC Rules, the ICC is extensively
involved in the administration of individual arbitrations. Among other things, the
ICC is responsible for "appointing arbitrators if a party defaults or if the parties
are unable to agree upon a presiding arbitrator or sole arbitrator; considering chal-
lenges to the independence of arbitrators; . . . reviewing a tribunal's award for
formal defects, and fixing the arbitrator's compensation." ICC Rules of Arbitra-
tion, arts. 9, 11, 27, 31. Many parties use the Rules of the Court of Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Court) at Paris, created in 1923.
The ICC Court is responsible for most significant administrative decisions in ICC
arbitrations. The ICC Court is not, in fact, a "court," and does not itself decide
substantive legal disputes or act as an arbitrator. Rather, the ICC Court acts in a
supervisory and appointing capacity under the ICC Rules. International Court of
Arbitration: Dispute Resolution Services, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/
id4590/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
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Latin American investors in other Latin American countries [have
also used ICSID], such as by Chilean investors against the Republics
of Peru and Bolivia and by a Peruvian investor against the Republic
of Paraguay. Because ICSID's Additional Facility serves as one pos-
sible venue for arbitration proceedings under NAFTA, ICSID has
also been host to some 15 NAFTA claims, including 12 against Mex-
ico and three against the United States.1 8
Finally, ICSID must change its governing structure to ensure its contin-
ued relevance in the field of international arbitration. There is no ques-
tion that ICSID is under-funded and under-staffed, particularly when its
facilities are increasingly used for non-ICSID investor-state arbitrations,
such as those under the UNCITRAL Rules. Such changes would be con-
sistent with the ICSID Convention, which is extremely difficult to amend.
Part II of this article will briefly consider the UNCITRAL Rules' his-
tory and purpose, highlight some basic provisions, and examine their ju-
risdictional scope. The UNCITRAL Rules are intended to be acceptable
in countries with different legal, social, and economic systems and are
widely used in both ad hoc arbitrations and administered arbitrations.
Next, the main provisions in the UNCITRAL Rules that could signifi-
cantly impact investor-state arbitrations will be discussed in detail and
contrasted with the proposed rule changes, and other rules and processes,
such as those under ICSID. UNCITRAL's future rule changes are in-
tended to more easily resolve investor-state disputes or entertain claims
for breach of customary or conventional international law, while not al-
tering the structure of the UNCITRAL Rules' text, spirit, or drafting
style, and also are intended to respect the text's flexibility rather than
make it more complex.
II. ICSID ARBITRATION RULES
The ICSID was established under the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (Con-
vention).1 9 The executive directors of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (World Bank) formulated the ICSID
Convention with the belief that an institution specially designed to facili-
tate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and for-
eign investors could help promote increased flows of international
investment in development projects.20 The ICSID Convention entered
18. Jean E. Kalicki, ICSID Arbitration in the Americas, in ARBITRATION REVIEW OF
THE AMERICAS 2007, at 5, http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/1/
sections/1/international.htm.
19. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1.
20. ICSID is first and foremost an economic development tool. While ICSID is an
"autonomous international organization" with its own governing body, the admin-
istrative council, it is still considered part of the World Bank family. Freshwater
Action Network, The World Bank Group, www.freshwateraction.net/web/w/
www 57_en.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). Indeed, "[a]ll of ICSID's members
are also members of the [World] Bank. [The World Bank's] Governor sits ex of-
ficio on ICSID's Administrative Council. The [ICSID Secretariat's expenses] are
2007]
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into force on October 14, 1966.21 As of May 9, 2007, 144 countries have
ratified the Convention. 22
The ICSID Convention and Centre provide an institutional framework
for conciliation and for arbitration of disputes between private investors
and host governments. Indeed, ICSID's jurisdiction extends only "to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State... or... any subdivision.., and a national of another Contracting
State."'23 Thus, ICSID is an attempt to institutionalize dispute resolution
between states and non-state investors. It therefore always presents a
"mixed" arbitration.
Recourse to ICSID conciliation and arbitration is entirely voluntary.
But, once the parties have consented to arbitration under the ICSID
Convention, neither can unilaterally withdraw its consent. 24 Disputes re-
garding jurisdiction (predicated upon disputes arising "directly out of" an
investment, between a contracting state and the national of another, and
written consent to submission), moreover, may be decided by the arbitra-
tion tribunal and appealed to an ad hoc committee created from the
panel of arbitrators by the administrative council of the ICSID.25 Annul-
ment, however, is available only if the tribunal "was not properly consti-
tuted," "exceeded its powers," "serious[ly] depart[ed] from a
fundamental rule of procedure, failed to state the reasons [for its] award,"
or included a member who practiced corruption.2 6 Finally, all ICSID
contracting states, whether or not parties to the dispute, are required by
the Convention to recognize and enforce ICSID arbitral awards. 27
Pursuant to article 6(1)(a)-(c) of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID ad-
ministrative council adopted regulations and rules supplementing the
Convention's provisions, generally referred to as the ICSID Regulations
and Rules. They comprise:
financed out of the World Bank's budget, although the costs of individual proceed-
ings are borne by the parties involved. Id.
21. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1.
22. Id. List of Contracting States, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-
en.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter ICSID Contracting States]. The
ICSID Convention is implemented in the United States by 22 U.S.C. § 1650 and
§ 1650a. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650, 1650a (2000). Other Western Hemisphere countries
that have ratified the ICSID Convention include: Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, and Uruguay. As will be discussed below, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
also ratified the ICSID Convention but have sent formal notice to the World Bank
declaring their withdrawal from ICSID, as of May 9, 2007. Nicaragua, Venezuela
and Bolivia withdraw from ICSID, NICARAGUA NETWORK HOTLINES, May 8,
2007, http://www.nicanet.org/hotline-may082007.php [hereinafter Withdrawal
from ICSID].
23. Id. art. 25(1).
24. Id.
25. Id. arts. 41, 52.
26. Id. art. 52.
27. Id. arts. 53(1), 27(1) (in effect empowering a private investor to enforce an ICSID
award in all contracting states, not merely a state that is a party to the suit).
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(i) the ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations, which
regulate the details of ICSID's administration of conciliation
and arbitration proceedings; 28
(ii) the ICSID Institution Rules, which set forth procedures for the
initiation of conciliation and arbitration proceedings under the
ICSID Convention;29
(iii) the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which set forth procedures for the
conduct of the various phases of an arbitration proceeding, in-
cluding the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the presentation
by the parties of their case and the preparation of the arbitral
award;30 and
(iv) the ICSID Conciliation Rules, which set forth similar proce-
dures for the conduct of the conciliation proceedings.31
In addition to providing facilities for conciliation and arbitration under
the Convention, ICSID established an additional facility for administer-
ing certain disputes that do not arise directly out of an investment and for
investment disputes in which one party is not a contracting state to the
ICSID Convention or the national of a contracting state.3 2 For example,
chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement governs foreign
investment and provides for the resolution of investment disputes be-
tween the government of a member state and a private investor of an-
other member state.33 These disputes may be submitted to arbitration
under the ICSID Convention where the government and investors are
both from member countries. 34 But Canada and Mexico are not yet IC-
SID members, leaving the arbitration for either the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules.35 Only UNCITRAL Rules are
available for disputes between Mexico and Canada since neither is an
ICSID member.36
28. See ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, at 51.
29. Id., Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Pro-
ceedings, at 73, [hereinafter ICSID Convention, Institution Rules].
30. Id., Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, at 99, [hereinafter ICSID
Convention, Arbitration Rules].
31. Id., Rules of Procedure for Conciliation Proceedings, at 81, [hereinafter ICSID
Convention, Conciliation Rules].
32. The first two NAFTA investment disputes, each involving a U.S. investor and the
Mexican government, chose to use the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. See
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2000); Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W.
Bank), Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 39 I.L.M. 537 (1999).
33. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
34. NAFTA art. 1120.
35. See id.
36. Id. Canada signed the ICSID Convention on December 15, 2006, and introduced a
House of Commons bill on March 30, 2007 to ratify it. British Columbia, New-
foundland and Labrador, Ontario, and Saskatchewan have already beaten the fed-
eral government in ratifying the convention by adopting implementing legislation.
See Canada Signs the ICSID Convention, in NEWS from ICSID, Vol. 23, No. 2
(2006) at 1, http:/lwww.worldbank.org/icsid/news/ICSIDNews Winter06_CRA.
pdf; and Canada introduces ICSID convention bill (April 4, 2007), http://www.
2007]
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The additional facility is intended for use by parties having long-term
relationships of economic importance to the state party to the dispute and
which involve the commitment of substantial resources on the part of ei-
ther party. 37 The facility is not designed to service disputes which fall
within the ICSID Convention or that are "ordinary commercial transac-
tion" disputes.38 ICSID's Secretary-General must give advance approval
of an agreement contemplating use of the additional facility. 39 The facil-
ity has its own arbitration rules,40 which naturally resemble the ICSID
Regulations and Rules.41
A. CHANGES TO THE ICSID RULES AND REGULATIONS
The dramatic increase in arbitration under ICSID's Rules and Regula-
tions led ICSID, in April 2006, to implement a number of reforms to its
rules.42 The amendments "were the product of 18 months' consultation
with ICSID contracting states, the business community, civil society, arbi-
tration experts and other arbitral institutions. They are intended to make
ICSID proceedings more streamlined and transparent, while instilling
greater confidence in the arbitral process. '43 As amended, the rules now
provide for preliminary procedures concerning provisional measures, ex-
pedited procedures for dismissal of unmeritorious claims, access of non-
disputing parties to proceedings, publication of awards, and additional
disclosure requirements for arbitrators.44
The new amendments of the ICSID Arbitration Rules were also made
to all of the corresponding provisions of the Additional Facility Arbitra-
tion Rules, except for the section on provisional measures. This excep-
tion is explained by the difference between the ICSID Arbitration Rules
globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/3761/canada-introduces-icsid-conven-
tion-bill.
37. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 4.
38. Id. arts. 2(b), 4(3).
39. Id. art. 4.
40. Id.
41. The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also influenced the Additional Facility
Rules. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 2. For example, like article 26 of the UN-
CITRAL Arbitration Rules, article 47 (now article 46) of the Additional Facility
Arbitration Rules provided that recourse to national courts for provisional mea-
sures would not be deemed incompatible with the arbitration agreement.
42. The ICSID Convention can be amended but only if all contracting states ratify the
amendment. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 66. It is thus not surprising that
the ICSID Convention has never been amended. Conversely, amendment of the
ICSID and Additional Facility Arbitration Rules requires only a decision of the
administrative council. Id. art. 6. Adoption of any new ICSID rules similarly is
done by decision of the administrative council. Amendments were adopted in
1984, 1999, and 2002. Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the Regulations and
Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 41 Int'l
Law. 47 (2007).
43. Steven P. Finizio et al., Recent Developments in Investor-State Arbitration: Effec-
tive Use of Provisional Measures, in EUROPEAN ARBITRATION REVIEW 2007,
(Global Arbitration Review, 2007), available at http://www.globalarbitrationre-
view.com/ear04_icsid.cfm.
44. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 1, rules 39, 41, 37, 48, and 6.
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and the Additional Facility Arbitration Rules in regard to court-ordered
provisional measures. Under article 46 of the Additional Facility Arbitra-
tion Rules, in contrast to the position under ICSID arbitration rule 39, it
is not deemed inconsistent with the arbitration agreement for a party to
seek such measures. 45
1. Procedural Innovations
a. Revised Rule 39: Provisional Measures
Possibly the most significant reforms to ICSID's Rules and Regulations
in 2006 (at least from the point of view of the parties) are found in rule 39
governing provisional measures. Indeed, if parties pay careful attention
to the strategic considerations outlined below, they will maximize their
ability to successfully protect their rights.46
The revised rule 39 allows for the submission of requests for provi-
sional measures as soon as a dispute is registered with ICSID, even
before the tribunal has been constituted.4 7 Under old rule 39, by con-
trast, parties were required to wait until the tribunal had been constituted
before submitting a request for provisional measures, which could take
months.4 8 In addition to the time needed to review and register a request
for arbitration, four months or more may be required to constitute an
arbitral tribunal.49
The revised rule 39 also requires ICSID's Secretary-General to impose
an immediate briefing schedule, so that the issue is timely considered by
the tribunal as soon as it is formed.50 At the same time, parties can still
seek provisional measures from national courts, as well as the tribunal, if
authorized by the applicable investment treaty or arbitration agree-
ment.51 Such arrangements, however, are uncommon.52
The revised rule 39, therefore, allows the selection of arbitrators and
the exchange of written submissions (both time consuming procedures) to
run in parallel rather than in series.5 3 And, as revised, rule 39 allows for a
deadline for briefing provisional measures, which must be completed in
time for the tribunal to consider the request for provisional measures
45. Compare ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 4, with ICSID Convention,
supra note 1.
46. Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 43. Provisional measures are measures
of interim relief to preserve the party's rights, such as preliminary injunctions, or-
ders preserving property or evidence, or orders requiring parties to post a security,
while the arbitral proceedings are pending. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1,
ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, at 118.
47. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, Arbitration Rules, at 39(5).
48. Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 43.
49. ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration
(ICSID Secretariat, Discussion Paper, Oct. 22, 2004), at 5 [hereinafter ICSID Dis-
cussion Paper].
50. See Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 43.
51. See ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 39(6).
52. See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 5.
53. See ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 39.
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promptly upon being constituted. 54 Notwithstanding these revisions, the
process may still involve significant delays, so parties may well be advised
to consider seeking provisional measures in domestic courts as well, if
they are available.
i. Procedure Governing Requests for Provisional Measures
Given the significance of these revisions, it is important to understand
the mechanics of revised rule 39's provisional measures process and how
to effectively use that process.55 First, article 47 of the ICSID Convention
allows a tribunal, "if it considers that the circumstances so require, rec-
ommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party. '5 6 Rule 39, however, provides a more
specific framework for the request and consideration of such measures. 57
Although rule 39 allows the tribunal to grant interim relief of its own
accord, parties facing threatened harm to their interests should initiate a
request for relief.58 Indeed, rule 39(1) allows a party to make a request
for relief "[a]t any time after the institution of the proceeding" (at any
time after the ICSID Secretary-General has registered the request for
arbitration) .59
Second, "before a tribunal may grant provisional relief, it must give
both parties an opportunity to be heard."'60 Rule 39(4), however, is vague
regarding "the number and type of written submissions that the parties
are entitled to file,. . . the timing of such submissions, and the process for
establishing a briefing schedule." If the parties agree on a schedule, "the
tribunal-or the Secretary-General under Rule 39(5)-will likely defer to
the parties' agreement." Otherwise, "the tribunal must impose a sched-
ule that is fair and meets the objectives of the rules. For example, Rule
31, which governs the exchange of written submissions on the merits, re-
quires a memorial on the merits from the requesting party and a counter-
memorial from the responding party, and then allows a reply and respon-
sive rejoinder either at the order of the tribunal or upon agreement by
the parties." This process might be cumbersome, even unavoidable, par-
ticularly when the issues are complex and the tribunal is not familiar with
the facts of the case. Accordingly, "the party seeking relief should con-
sider invoking the Rule 39(5) process immediately upon registration of its
claim and file its opening observations in support of provisional mea-
sures" as soon as possible. Indeed, if a party's request for provisional
measures necessitates a substantial evidentiary showing, then the party
should "begin developing its case on provisional measures well before the
54. See Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 43.
55. Id.
56. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 47.
57. See ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 39.
58. Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 43.
59. ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 39(1). See also ICSID
Convention, Institution Rules, supra note 1, rule 6(2).
60. Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 42.
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dispute is registered at ICSID. ''61
Third, rule 39(2) requires tribunals to rule on a request for provisional
measures before devoting substantial time to complicated jurisdictional
questions. "Where a request is particularly urgent, parties may ask the
tribunal to streamline both the number of written submissions and the
time allowed for such submissions so that a decision can be made expedi-
tiously." A tribunal might quickly grant 'temporary relief on a tight brief-
ing schedule in the face of genuine urgency, and then ... revisit the issue
later under Rule 39(3), which allows the tribunal to "at any time modify
or revoke its recommendations. '62
Lastly, "although the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules" do not
explicitly grant a tribunal the coercive authority to enforce provisional
measures against a party, "the weight of ICSID authority treats compli-
ance with provisional measures as mandatory. '63 A tribunal, moreover,
"can take a party's failure to comply with provisional measures into con-
sideration when fashioning an ultimate award, for example, by adjusting
the amount of damages or imposing other forms of permanent injunctive
relief.'"64
ii. Grounds for Granting Requests for Provisional Measures
ICSID case law presents a range of "grounds that ICSID tribunals have
relied on in granting requests for provisional relief:" "[p]reventing irrepa-
rable" harm or damage; "[pireventing aggravation of the dispute;"
"[p]reserving the tribunal's ability to issue a final award;" and
"[e]njoining parallel proceedings" pursuant to article 26 of the ICSID
Convention. 65 Also, the need for provisional measures must be urgent
and necessary to preserve the status quo.
"Rule 39(1) requires parties to demonstrate 'the circumstances that re-
quire such [provisional] measures." 66 For example, to prove irreparable
harm, a party must demonstrate that the harm they suffered cannot be
compensated-for by damages. 67 Also, to show urgency, a party must
demonstrate some likelihood that the threatened injury could occur
61. Id.
62. Id. (internal citations omitted).
63. Id., citing Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/97/7, 1 9 (1999).
The arbitration rule 47 refers to a tribunal's ability to "recommend" provisional
measures. ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 47.
64. Id., citing MINE v. Guinea, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/84/4 (1988) (reduc-
ing award to reflect expenses incurred by losing party because of winning party's
violation of ICSID Convention).
65. Id. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention provides that "[clonsent of the parties to
arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed con-
sent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy." ICSID Convention,
supra note 1, art. 26.
66. Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 43 (internal citation omitted).
67. See id., citing Plama Consortium Ltd v. Bulgaria, Order, ICSID (W. Bank), Case
No. ARB/03/24, 1 46 (2005). In the private commercial arbitration context, how-
ever, a showing of serious injury sometimes satisfies 'irreparable injury,' whether
technically reparable or not. Id.
2007]
896 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
before a final award can be issued. 68
iii. Other Considerations
"[P]arties may need to show a prima facie case for jurisdiction before a
tribunal will issue provisional measures in their favour."'69 In addition,
parties generally are not required "to demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits as a prerequisite for obtaining provisional measures. 70
"Indeed, in [Maffezini v. Spain, the tribunal] held that it 'should avoid
'pre-judging' the merits of the dispute when resolving a request for provi-
sional measures. ' 71 Parties, nevertheless, should still present a "succinct"
and "persuasive". "case for relief along with any request for provisional
measures." 72 A tribunal is more likely to "grant provisional measures
where the claimant's case appears unpersuasive on its face," than not.73
iv. Conclusion
Time will tell whether ICSID's April 2006 amendments make ICSID
proceedings more streamlined and transparent. At a minimum, ICSID's
revised rules governing provisional measures are significantly more at-
tractive as a route for parties facing an urgent need for relief at the start
of investor-state arbitration proceedings.
b. Revised Rule 41: Preliminary Objections
Article 36(3) of the ICSID Convention grants the Secretary-General
the responsibility of screening requests for arbitration.74 This screening
power, however, does not extend to the merits of the dispute or to cases
where jurisdiction is merely doubtful. Indeed, ICSID's Secretary-Gen-
eral can only refuse to register a request for arbitration if, on the basis of
the information contained in a request for arbitration under the ICSID
Convention, the dispute is manifestly outside ICSID's jurisdiction.75
The Secretary-General's limited screening power, and the increase in
the number of ICSID cases, forced ICSID to revise rule 41.76 The revised
68. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/02/18, 8 (2003).
69. Finizio, Recent Developments, supra note 43. Jurisdiction is predicated upon dis-
putes arising "directly out of" an investment, between a contracting state and the
national of another, and written consent to submission to arbitration under ICSID.
See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
70. Id.
71. Id. See also Maffezini, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/97/7, T 21.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(3).
75. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 36. After a request for arbitration is
registered, the parties are invited to proceed to constitute the arbitral tribunal.
Registration, however, does not prejudice the powers and functions of the arbitral
tribunal in regard to jurisdiction and the merits of the dispute. Once constituted,
the tribunal may dismiss the claim on the merits or for lack of jurisdiction. If the
tribunal considers the claim to have been frivolous, it may also award costs to the
respondent. ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 6-7.
76. Id.
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rule 41 (with a new paragraph (5)) permits the tribunal, at its discretion,
to dismiss all or part of a claim on the merits at the request of a party on
an expedited basis.77 A party, however, must file an objection that a
claim is manifestly without merit within thirty days of the creation of the
tribunal and before the tribunal's first session to obtain an expedited re-
view. 78 Moreover, the denial by the tribunal of a party's request does not
prejudice other objections the party might make.79 Similar changes were
made to the corresponding provisions in article 45 of the Additional Fa-
cility Rules.80
2. Greater Transparency and Public Participation
a. Revised Rule 32: The Oral Procedure
In certain cases, it could be useful to open hearings to persons other
than those directly involved in the proceeding. Open hearings would pro-
vide the public with greater transparency of ICSID's investor-state arbi-
tration process. 81 To accomplish this goal, ICSID revised rule 32. The
revised rule 32 allows the tribunal to permit persons besides the parties,
their agents, etc. to attend the hearings or even open them to the public,
without the consent of both parties, provided it considers the views of the
disputing parties and consults with the Secretariat. 82 Under old rule 32,
the tribunal could allow other persons to attend the hearings only with
77. ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Inter-
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID, Working Paper
2005), at 7 [hereinafter ICSID Working Paper]. See also ICSID Convention, Arbi-
tration Rules, supra note 1, rule 41(5).
78. See ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 41(5).
79. Id.
80. See ICSID Working Paper, supra note 77, at 8. Interestingly, the U.S. in its post-
NAFFA free trade agreements has included a provision that requires the tribunal
to decide preliminary issues at the outset of the dispute rather than joining them to
the merits on an expedited basis. For example, the U.S.-Chile FTA, article 10.19,
permits a respondent to raise an objection that a dispute is not within a tribunal's
competence. As such, upon receipt of an objection, the tribunal must, as a prelimi-
nary matter, suspend any proceedings on the merits and consider the objection.
Where a request is made for a decision on an expedited basis, a decision on the
objection must be issued within 150 days of the request (160 if there is a hearing,
and 180 if the tribunal shows "extraordinary cause"). Additionally, the Chile FTA
authorizes the tribunal
to award to the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and attorneys'
fees incurred in submitting or opposing the objection. In determining
whether such an award is warranted, the tribunal shall consider whether
either the claimant's claim or the respondent's objection was frivolous,
and shall provide the disputing parties a reasonable opportunity to
comment.
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/
Chile/text/ [hereinafter Chile FTA]. Presumably, these provisions eliminate frivo-
lous claims-member governments do not want to defend claims on the merits
that they believe should have been dismissed on procedural grounds. See David
A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 679 (2004).
81. See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 10.
82. See ICSID Working Paper, supra note 77, at 10. See also ICSID Convention, Arbi-
tration Rules, supra note 1, rule 32(2).
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the consent of the parties. In addition, the revised rule 32 requires the
tribunal, when necessary, to prescribe procedures to protect proprietary
information and make the appropriate logistical arrangements.83 This is
consistent with article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention, which prohibits
ICSID from publishing an "award without the consent of the parties.
84
Similar changes were made to the corresponding provisions in article
39(2) of the Additional Facility Rules. 85
b. Revised Rule 37: Visits and Inquiries; Submissions of Non-
disputing Parties
Amicus participation is clearly desirable in investor-state dispute settle-
ment proceedings, as it provides not only non-governmental organiza-
tions, but also business groups, whose values and interests are implicated
in the dispute, an opportunity to directly state their points of view. 86 In-
83. See ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 32(2).
84. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 48.
85. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 4, art. 39(2).
86. See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 9. It should be noted, however, that
the authority to accept amicus briefs in disputes under trade agreements is one of
the most controversial aspects of dispute resolution since it raises several procedu-
ral issues, including how to deal with potentially dozens of amicus briefs in a par-
ticular case, thereby taxing an already limited resource for dispute settlement, and
whether the admission of amicus briefs is a step toward participation in oral pro-
ceedings. Indeed, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement body
(DSB) has been grappling with these questions for years. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The
WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Res-
olution, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 197 (2002). In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the appel-
late body (AB) reversed the panel's ruling that it did not have the authority to
accept amicus submissions from non-governmental entities. See Appellate Body
Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
1 110, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). The panel had considered that since it had
a right to 'seek' information from any person pursuant to article 13 of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), it was prohibited from considering
non-requested information. The AB held that the reading of the word 'seek' as a
prohibition of this kind ignored the context, which was a very broad grant of fact-
finding authority to the panel in order that the panel could discharge its article 11
obligation to make an 'objective assessment of the facts.' Id. 1 107, 108. The AB
went on to find that the combined scope of article 12 (which allows a panel to
create its own procedures, deviating from the default procedures in appendix 3 of
the DSU) and article 13 gives panels broad procedural discretion in how they dis-
charge their duty under DSU article XI "to make an objective assessment of the
matter.., including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and conformity
with the relevant covered agreements." Id. 106 (emphasis in original). Panels in a
number of disputes since have considered amicus submissions by non-governmen-
tal organizations. In the Asbestos case, the AB set out a special procedure accord-
ing to which entities would apply for leave to submit a brief to the AB. Appellate
Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, 91 52, WT[DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); Communication
from the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000). According to the
special procedure an application must, inter alia, disclose the nature of the entity
applying for leave, its interest in the case, and whether it is being financed or sup-
ported by the parties. Also, the applicant would have to explain, briefly, how its
submission would help the AB decide the case, going beyond the arguments the
parties themselves could be expected to make. Far from assuaging due process
and related concerns, however, the special procedure in Asbestos provoked a viru-
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deed, in the ICSID Convention arbitration proceedings initiated against
Argentina regarding water services concessions, the arbitral tribunal in
2005 affirmed its power to accept and consider written submissions from
interested third parties. 87 Accordingly, ICSID revised rule 37 to allow for
amicus briefs.88 Indeed, ICSID tribunals may now accept and consider
written submissions from a non-disputing person or state, but only after
consulting with both parties.8 9 But, the tribunal must be satisfied that a
submission by a non-disputing party would be helpful in the determina-
tion of a factual or legal issue within the scope of the dispute, that the
non-disputing party has a significant interest in the dispute, and that the
amicus submission would not disrupt the proceeding or unfairly burden
either party.90 Still, it is unclear how the tribunal would deal with poten-
tially dozens of amicus briefs in a particular case. The requirement that
amicus briefs not disrupt the arbitral proceeding may grant the tribunal
the ability to limit the number of amicus submissions it accepts. Similar
changes were made to the corresponding provisions in Article 41 of the
Additional Facility Rules. 91
c. Revised Rule 48: Rendering of the Award
Prompt publication of awards issued at ICSID has become particularly
important in light of the increase in the number of ICSID cases, as many
cases involving similar issues are pending. 92 In order to facilitate the
timely publication of awards by making their early publication
mandatory, the ICSID revised rule 48.9 3 Article 48(5) of the ICSID Con-
vention and the first sentence of the revised rule 48(4) provide that IC-
lent backlash by delegates at the WTO for pre-empting the rights of the member-
ship itself to establish procedures for dispute settlement, for compromising the
nature of the WTO as a member-driven organization and for pandering to devel-
oped-country NGOs. Briefs in a Twist, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9-15, 2000, at 85; LDCs
Rally Against WTO Appellate Body Bid on NGO Submissions, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 17, 2000, at 12-13; WTO General Council, Minutes of Meeting of
Nov. 22, 2000, 120 WT/GC/M/60 (Jan. 23, 2001). Nonetheless, the AB decided to
reject all of the applications for leave submitted to it since they did not comply
sufficiently with the formal requirements for an application for leave. Although it
has never again attempted to create a formal procedure for submission of amicus
briefs, since Asbestos, the AB has reaffirmed that is has the discretion to accept
such briefs. The AB also accepts amicus briefs not only from NGOs and private
individuals but also WTO Member governments. Appellate Body Report, Euro-
pean Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, IT 157-165, WT/DS2311AB/R
(Sept. 26, 2002).
87. See Aguas Cordobesas S.A., Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.Bank), Case
No. ARB/03/18 (2007) & Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/03/19, 16 (2007) (case
pending).
88. See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 9. ICSID noted that submissions
from third parties had been accepted and considered in two investor-state arbitra-
tions governed by the UNCITRAL Rules. Id.
89. ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, art. 37(2).
90. Id.
91. Id. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 4, art. 41(2).
92. See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 7, 9.
93. See ICSID Working Paper, supra note 77, at 9.
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SID shall not publish an award without the consent of the parties. 94 If
ICSID does not have the required consent of both parties for publication
of the full text of the award, and it is not published by another source,
ICSID must promptly publish excerpts of the legal conclusions of the tri-
bunal.95 Similar changes were made to the corresponding provisions in
article 53(3) of the Additional Facility Rules.96
The old rule 48, by contrast, authorized, but did not require, ICSID to
publish excerpts from the awards. In addition, there was no provision as
to the timeliness of publication of excerpts of the main holdings while
ICSID waited to receive the consent of both parties for it to publish an
award, which occasionally took several months.97
3. Rules Governing Arbitrators
a. Revised Rule 6: Constitution of the Tribunal
Expanding the disclosure requirements for arbitrators has become par-
ticularly important with the large number of new cases being registered
by ICSID and the increased scope for possible conflicts of interest.98 Ac-
cordingly, ICSID revised rule 6. These changes were designed to ensure
an arbitrator's impartiality and independence. 99 Indeed, the revised rule
6 requires the arbitrator to disclose, not only any past or present relation-
ships with the parties, but also any circumstances likely to give rise to
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's reliability for independent judg-
ment.100 Under the former rule 6, by contrast, the arbitrator was only
required to disclose any past or present professional, business, and other
relationships (if any) with the parties. 10 1
The revised rule 6 also extends the period of time over which disclo-
sures are to be made, by requiring that the obligation be continuous
throughout the entire proceeding, not just at its commencement.1 0 2 The
94. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 48(5); ICSID Convention, Arbitration
Rules, supra note 1, art. 48(4).
95. See ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 48(4).
96. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 4, rule 53(3).
97. ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 8-9.
98. Id. at 12. Articles 14(1) and 40(2) of the ICSID Convention require all ICSID
arbitrators to be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in
the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exer-
cise independent judgment. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, arts. 14(1),
40(2).
99. ICSID Working Paper, supra note 77, at 12.
100. See ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 6(2).
101. See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 12-13.
102. Id. at 13. The NAFT'A Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures under
chapters 19 and 20 similarly requires the disclosure of "any interest, relationship or
matter" that could affect an arbitrator's independence or impartiality or that
"might reasonably create an appearance of impropriety or an apprehension of
bias." NAFTA Secretariat, Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures
Under Chapters 19 and 20 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, at 19 A
(1), http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index-e.aspx?ArticlelD=l (look
under "Legal Texts") (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). The obligation to disclose inter-
ests, relationships and matters that may bear on the integrity or impartiality of the
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declarations are then transmitted by ICSID to the arbitrators and to the
parties. 10 3 Similar changes were made to the corresponding provisions in
article 13(2) of the Additional Facility Rules. 10 4
b. Revised Regulation 14: Direct Costs of Individual Proceedings
Pursuant to ICSID's administrative and financial regulation 14, the
Secretary-General sets standard daily fees for members of conciliation
commissions, arbitral tribunals, and annulment committees.10 5 But, in ac-
cordance with article 60(2) of the Convention, the parties and the com-
mission, tribunal, or committee may agree on a different rate of
remuneration than the standard fee.10 6 ICSID, therefore, revised regula-
tion 14 clarifying that requests for increases in the applicable rate will
only be made in exceptional circumstances and must be made through
ICSID. 10 7 This resulted from situations where tribunal members objected
at the outset to ICSID's standard rate of $350 an hour and asked for
much more, sometimes $500-$600 an hour. Revised regulation 14 pre-
sumably makes it much more difficult for arbitrators to make such
demands. 108
4. Conclusion
By creating new mechanisms for interim measures of relief, motions to
dismiss, amicus briefs, publication of awards, and arbitrator disclosure,
ICSID is striving to produce a more robust system for adjudicating inves-
tor-state disputes. Although the changes are incremental, they reflect a
growing trend in investor-state arbitration towards increased trans-
parency and public participation, and a greater willingness to draw inspi-
ration from litigation based models of dispute resolution. The real effect
of these reforms on investor-state arbitration will depend on how they are
implemented in practice. Investors and corporate counsel are well ad-
vised to keep informed about these developments as they consider inves-
tor-state arbitration as a means of resolving disputes with government
entities.109
dispute settlement process is continuous throughout the entire proceeding. Id. at
19 (C). Disclosure obligations, however, are balanced against the need for persons
in the legal or business community to serve as arbitrators, and should not deprive
the Parties and participants of the services of those who are best qualified to serve
as arbitrators. Id. Part II, Introductory Note.
103. ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 6.
104. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 4, art. 13(2).
105. ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, regulation 14.
106. Id. art. 60(2).
107. Id. regulation 14.
108. See BORN, supra note 13.
109. See ICSID Discussion Paper, supra note 49, at 14-16.
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B. THE FUTURE?
1. Appellate Review of ICSID Arbitral Awards
The revised ICSID rules are also noteworthy for what they do not in-
clude: a new appeals process. In October 2004, ICSID's Secretariat pro-
posed an appellate mechanism to be located at ICSID. 110 According to
the ICSID Discussion Paper, efficiency and economy, as well as coher-
ence and consistency in ICSID case law, would best be served by ICSID
offering a single appeal mechanism as opposed to multiple treaty-based
mechanisms.1 11 The paper further asserted that the appeals facility would
expand the scope of review of ICSID awards from any of the five grounds
for annulment of an award set out in article 52 of the ICSID Convention,
to also include review of the substantive correctness of an award. 112
On May 12, 2005, however, the appeals facility was shelved for further
study as "it [would be] premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID
mechanism."' 113 Apparently, the contracting states, particularly capital-
exporting states and the investors they represent, valued the high degree
of finality the current ICSID arbitration process provides parties in
resolving disputes more than the benefit of substantive consistency. 114
Indeed, the finality of ICSID awards is central to ICSID's purpose of
acting as a neutral venue providing an effective remedy for investors. Ar-
ticle 53 of the ICSID Convention dictates that an ICSID award is "bind-
ing on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal." 115 Article 54,
moreover, requires contracting states to recognize and enforce ICSID
awards as if they were final judgments of their local courts. 11 6 Thus, by
equating ICSID awards to domestic judgments, as opposed to foreign,
ICSID eliminates all review. In this respect the ICSID enforcement
mechanism seems much more efficient than the regime under the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, 117 which provides both procedural and substantive excep-
110. Id. at 4, 14-15.
111. Id. at 15-16.
112. Id. Annex.
113. ICSID Working Paper, supra note 77, at 4.
114. David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in In-
vestor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 44-
45 (2006).
The most extreme example of conflicting interpretations is evident in the
"Lauder" cases, which involved a dispute between a U.S. investor and
the Czech Government. Ronald S. Lauder, under the United States-
Czech BIT, brought one action, while CME Czech Republic B.V. (a
Dutch company owned by Lauder) brought the other in Stockholm
under the Netherlands-Czech BIT. The two tribunals reached very dif-
ferent results despite the similarity of the two BITs. Most significantly,
the London tribunal declined to find an expropriation, while the Stock-
holm tribunal, on the same facts, determined that an expropriation had
indeed taken place. Id.
115. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 53.
116. Id. art. 54(1).
117. U.N. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The U.N. Convention on Recognition and
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tions to the recognition of an arbitral award. 1 8 Consequently, investors
and contracting states will probably only embrace substantive review of
ICSID awards when they begin to lose more disputes, particularly those
disputes they perceive to have been wrongly decided.' 19 Meanwhile, IC-
SID's existing annulment procedure will continue to provide limited
grounds for review of awards, including whether the tribunal was prop-
erly constituted, manifestly exceeded its powers, or was corrupt. 120
In addition, an appellate mechanism, as opposed to the current annul-
ment procedure, would raise difficult technical and policy issues. For ex-
ample, ICSID arbitrations would in some instances be subject to the
mechanism and in other cases not. Also, as discussed below regarding
the United States, many countries are concluding treaties that envisage
the eventual creation of appeal mechanisms and the creation of an ICSID
appeals facility would only add to the number of appeal mechanisms. 121
Noteworthy is the advent of the United States as a defendant in
NAFTA chapter 11 investor-state disputes, causing the United States to
become the first capital-exporting state to break with investors' inter-
ests. 122 The United States now evaluates foreign investment law in both
an offensive and defensive light.123 Indeed, the U.S. Congress' decision
in the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 reflected Congress' fear that the United
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards [hereinafter the New York Convention] commits
the courts in contracting states to recognize and enforce arbitration awards. Id.
art. III. The New York Convention may apply to both commercial and non-com-
mercial awards. Under the New York Convention, there are two reservations
available to contracting states: the reciprocity reservation (only those awards made
in territories of contracting states will be enforced under the New York Conven-
tion) and the commercial reservation (limiting the Convention's application to
commercial matters). Id. art. 1(3). Over half of all signatories to the New York
Convention opted for reciprocity and one third of the signatories have elected the
commercial reservation. See Status 1958-Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/unci-
traltexts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html.
118. New York Convention, art. V. Article V of the New York Convention sets forth
exclusive exceptions to recognition of an arbitral award: invalidity of the arbitral
agreement; a violation of due process; procedural irregularities; non-arbitrability
of the dispute; violation of public policy; or failure of the award to become bind-
ing, or its suspension or setting aside in the country where the award was made.
Pursuant to the last defense, moreover, a successful appeal of an award in the
issuing state can prevent its enforcement abroad. Specifically, under article V, sec-
tion 1(e) of the New York Convention, a court can refuse recognition and enforce-
ment of an award when "the award ... has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which that award was made." Id. art.
V.1(e). Therefore, if the scope of judicial review in a rendering State extends be-
yond the New York Convention's other defenses, then the losing party's opportu-
nity to avoid enforcement is automatically enhanced. Kolkey, D., Attacking
Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in International Arbitration Awards,
22 INT'L LAW. 693 (1988).
119. See Walsh, supra note 16.
120. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 53.
121. See Gantz, supra note 114.
122. Barton Legum, Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: The New Generation of U.S.
Investment Treaty Arbitration Provisions, 19 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT
L.J. 344, 345-47 (2004).
123. See Walsh, supra note 16.
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States was about to lose one or more NAFTA disputes.1 24 This decision
encouraged agreement on substantive, as well as procedural, review of
awards from disputes arising under future trade agreements, which now
include the Chile Free Trade Agreement, and the Central American-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), among
others. 25 The Chile FTA at Annex 10-H provides: "Within three years
after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall con-
sider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism
to review awards rendered under Article 10.25 in arbitrations com-
menced after they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism."'1 26
CAFTA-DR, moreover, offers more detailed guidelines on developing
an appellate mechanism, possibly because of Congressional dissatisfac-
tion with the bare-bones formulation of the Chile FTA and its lack of a
short deadline for negotiations:
1. Within three months of entry into force of the Agreement, the
[Fair Trade] Commission shall establish a Negotiating Group to
develop an appellate body or similar mechanism to review
awards rendered by tribunals under this Chapter. Such appellate
body or similar mechanism shall be designed to provide coher-
ence to the interpretation of investment provisions in the Agree-
ment. The Commission shall direct the negotiating Group to
take into account the following issues, among others:
a) the nature and composition of an appellate body or similar
mechanism;
b) the applicable scope and standard of review;
c) transparency of proceedings of an appellate body or similar
mechanism;
d) the effect of decisions by an appellate body or similar
mechanism;
e) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar
mechanism to the arbitral rules that may be selected under
Articles 10.16 and 10.25; and
f) the relationship of review by an appellate body or similar
mechanism to existing domestic laws and international law on
the enforcement of arbitral awards.
2. The Commission shall direct the Negotiating Group to provide
to the Commission, within one year of establishment of the Ne-
gotiating Group, a draft amendment to the Agreement that es-
tablishes an appellate body or similar mechanism. Upon
approval of the draft amendment by the Parties, in accordance
124. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b) (2000).
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding for-
eign investment are ... to secure for investors important rights compara-
ble to those that would be available under United States legal principles
and practice, by ... providing for an appellate body or similar mecha-
nism to provide coherence to the interpretations of trade agreements.
§ 3802(b)(3)(iv).
125. Daniel M. Price, US Trade Promotion Legislation, 2 TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MM-T. 47
(2005).
126. Chile ETA, supra note 80, annex 10-H.
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with Article 22.2 (Amendments), the Agreement shall be so
amended. 127
"Once the CAFTA-DR enters into force [fully], a one-year negotiating
process that may result in some sort of an agreement contemplating the
establishment of an appellate mechanism will trigger after 90 days, at
least for the seven CAFTA-DR partners. ' '128
Whether the CAFTA-DR nations will conclude negotiations regarding
the appellate mechanism within one year of the agreement going fully
into effect is open to speculation.
[T]hose in the U.S. Congress who supported the concept of an appel-
late mechanism in the TPA legislation of 2002, but opposed CAFTA-
DR in 2005, cannot be expected to support an amendment to
CAFTA-DR to establish an appellate mechanism. [Therefore, even
with] prompt agreement on an appellate mechanism by the CAFTA-
DR parties in the mandated negotiations it could take years (if at all)
before the CAFTA-DR is amended and even longer before the first
case reaches the appellate mechanism. 129
Another example of the United States' defensive posture regarding
foreign investment law is found in the so-called compromise between the
U.S. Trade Representative's Office and the Democratic party leadership
where it was agreed that there would be language (presumably in the
preamble of the newer FTA investment chapters) stating that "foreign
investors in the United States will not be accorded greater substantive
rights with respect to investment protections than those accorded United
States investors" under the U.S. Constitution. 130
2. Threat of Non-enforcement of ICSID Arbitral Awards in Latin
America
Although ICSID's automatic enforcement mechanism is more effective
than the regime under the New York Convention, article 54 does not re-
127. Central America- Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, annex 10-F, Aug.
5, 2004, http:// www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFrA/CAFTA-
DRFinal Texts/sectionIndex.html [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. While CAFTA-
DR was scheduled to enter into force January 1, 2006, for all seven members
(United States, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua), this did not occur. The U.S. Trade Representative's
Office announced on December 30, 2005, that CAFTA-DR would be implemented
on a rolling basis, and that the United States would "continue to work intensively
with CAFTA-DR partners to bring them on board as quickly as possible." Press
Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Statement of USTR
Spokesman Stephen Norton Regarding CAFTA-DR Implementation (Dec. 30,
2005), http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/SectionIndex.
html (look under "Press Releases"). As of April 1, 2007, the agreement had en-
tered into force for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United
States.
128. Gantz, supra note 114, at 47.
129. Id. at 75.
130. See Trade Facts, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Final Bipartisan Trade
Deal on Investment (May 11, 2007), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/
FactSheets/2007/SectionIndex.html.
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quire contracting states to enforce awards if under national law final judg-
ments could not be so executed.131 In addition, ICSID, like all other
international bodies, lacks institutional remedies against a non-complying
state. Consequently, the ICSID tribunal must rely on contracting states to
enforce an award within the framework of their national laws on sover-
eign immunity and existing treaty obligations. This reliance on national
courts is problematic. Economic crisis has occurred in Latin America,
and specifically Argentina; 132 and political instability can easily shift a
state's priority from foreign investment protection to satisfaction of local
interests, negatively impacting the attitude of domestic courts toward in-
ternational arbitration.
Latin American jurisdictions-notwithstanding the region's traditional
hostility towards international arbitration embodied in the Calvo Doc-
trine133-have engaged in extensive bilateral commitments to encourage
foreign direct investment in, among others, the energy and telecommuni-
cations industries. Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay ratified
the ICSID Convention. 134 Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela also rati-
fied the Convention, but later withdrew. 135 Latin American countries
that have ratified BITs with other nations include Argentina (54 BITs),
Chile (38 BITs), Ecuador (23 BITs), Mexico (18 BITs), Peru (28 BITs),
and Venezuela (21 BITs). 136 Additionally, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Colom-
bia, and the Central American countries have signed free trade agree-
ments with the United States, all providing for investment arbitration. 137
But economic instability in the region has had unexpected conse-
quences for the rights of foreign investors to arbitrate investment dis-
putes. Indeed, the Calvo Doctrine and intimations are reawakening.1 38
131. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 54(3).
132. See Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF,
and the Bankrupting of Argentina (2005).
133. Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues,
59 Disp. RESOL. J. 78, 80 (2004). Latin American jurisdictions traditionally em-
braced the Calvo Doctrine (named after the Argentinean diplomat Carlos Calvo),
which espoused nonintervention in Latin American affairs and absolute equality of
foreigners and Latin American nationals by providing that foreigners could only
seek redress for grievances before local courts. "The Calvo Doctrine gave rise to
the Calvo Clause, which precluded arbitration and instead required disputes to be
resolved in national courts. Latin American countries and State-owned companies
included a Calvo Clause in their investment contracts and agreements with foreign
investors." Id.
134. See ICSID Contracting States, supra note 22.
135. See Withdrawal from ICSID, supra note 22.
136. Cremades, supra note 133, at 81-82. "[Not] all of Latin America followed suit."
For example, "Brazil has only assumed regional investment obligations under the
Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
in MERCOSUR." Brazil, moreover, has not ratified the ICSID Convention or
any other international investment treaty providing for international arbitration.
Id.
137. See Cremades, supra note 133, at 81-82.
138. Mexico's experience with the Calvo Clause was also problematic to the NAFTA
negotiations of investment provisions. Indeed, Mexico was one of the Latin Amer-
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"For example, Argentina, which is currently named as a respondent in 29
pending ICSID arbitrations resulting from the government's 2002 emer-
gency monetary policy freezing local tariffs and abolishing U.S. dollar-to-
Peso convertibility, has sought to suspend these arbitrations."'' 39 Actu-
ally, in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic,140 CMS
sought to recover under the U.S.-Argentina BIT for losses it suffered fol-
lowing Argentina's suspension of a tariff regime applicable to a privatized
gas transportation company, Transportadora de Gas del Norte (TGN), in
which it had an investment. Argentina argued, inter alia, "that the ICSID
tribunal lacked jurisdiction because TGN's license for the transportation
of gas called for disputes to be settled before a Federal Court of Buenos
Aires, which precluded any other forum from having jurisdiction." 141
The tribunal, however, held that the ICSID tribunal had jurisdiction
over the dispute and that CMS was not bound by Argentina's licensing
agreement with TGN. [In addition] even if CMS had been a party, "re-
ferring certain kinds of disputes to the local courts... [is] not a bar to the
assertion of jurisdiction by an ICSID tribunal under the [BIT], as the
functions of these various instruments are different. '142 Subsequently,
Argentina filed for annulment and requested a stay of the enforcement of
the award until the application for annulment was decided.' 43
Argentina also launched a campaign against the validity of BIT provi-
sions providing for arbitration administered by ICSID, and the finality of
ICSID awards. 144 Indeed, Argentina advocated "'that local courts regain
control over all cases where international tribunals are involved"' and
bring disputes with foreign investors back within Argentina's jurisdic-
tion.145 "In particular ... Argentina stud[ied] the possibility of returning
ican countries that most adamantly adhered to the Calvo Clause and the principles
of the Calvo Doctrine. If a party (Canada or the United States) could not take up
the cause of one of its citizens with an investment in Mexico, who was aggrieved at
the action of the Mexican government, party-to-party dispute settlement would be
impossible. Accordingly, Mexico agreed to change its view, and adopted a new
arbitration regime based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration. See Ernesto Aguirre, International Economic Integration and
Trade in Financial Services, 27 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1057, 1063 (1996). See also
Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth
of the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 L. & POt'Y
INT'L Bus. 1169, 1179 (1995).
139. Cremades, supra note 133, at 81. "Additional cases against Argentina-currently
in amicable consultations-could be filed in the near future due to breach of com-
mitments with foreign investors." Id. at 81 n.8.
140. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, Annulment Proceed-
ing, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/01/8 (2003).
141. Cremades, supra note 133, at 83. CMS Gas, Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 1, 70.
142. Id. $ 76.
143. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No.
ARB/01/8, (2006).
144. Carlos E. Alfaro, ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged by the Argentina Gov-
ernment, (Alfaro-Abogados 2004), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=
30151.
145. Cremades, supra note 133, at 81 (internal citations omitted). Argentina's attorney
general's office in charge of the country's defense at ICSID advanced the argu-
ment that ICSID arbitration is unconstitutional based on the fact that eventual
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the jurisdiction of national courts in order to ensure that investors ex-
haust all legal domestic remedies, and the possibility of review of awards
of international tribunals by Argentinean courts.' 46
On September 1, 2006, however, the ICSID tribunal, in its decision or-
dering the stay of enforcement of the CMS award, noted that Argentina,
through the attorney general, in a letter dated June 12, 2006 provided "an
undertaking to CMS Gas Transmission Company that, in accordance with
its obligations under the ICSID Convention, it will recognize the award
rendered by the arbitral tribunal in this proceeding as binding and will
enforce any pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its terri-
tories, in the event annulment is not granted.1 4 7 The tribunal concluded
that the attorney general's letter "should dispel any doubts that CMS may
have legitimately had in the past [since it] irrevocably commits Argentina
to pay any pecuniary obligations enforced upon it under the award."'1 48
The Argentine government's turnaround regarding international arbi-
tration, as shown through the attorney general's letter, raises hopes that
Argentina will live up to its international duties in all cases submitted to
ICSID arbitration and will not require the review of an ICSID award by
local courts. It remains to been seen, however, whether Argentina will
generally agree to abide by adverse rulings on the merits or try to resist
them, either by annulment proceedings before ICSID itself or by simple
non-payment of awards.
Venezuela is another country in which the status of international arbi-
tration is changing. Although the Venezuelan Supreme Court rendered a
milestone decision in the Exploration Round Case,'14 9 upholding the arbi-
trability of disputes arising out of oil exploration contracts concluded by
the Venezuelan-owned oil company Petr6leos de Venezuela S.A.
(PDVSA) and various foreign investors in August 1999, President Hugo
Chdivez issued a decree on February 26, 2007, forcing private oil compa-
nies to hand control of their Venezuelan businesses to PDVSA, stating
that Venezuelan law will govern all the "facts and activities related to this
decree-law," and that disputes will be subject to the jurisdiction of Vene-
zuelan courts "in the manner provided by the Constitution of the
awards issued against the Republic would not be subject to judicial review. Since
Argentina's constitution subordinated international treaties to overarching public
law principles, its consent to ICSID did not encompass review of sovereign deci-
sions to safeguard essential public interests, such as restructuring and stabilizing
the national currency system, but was limited to disputes of a purely commercial
nature. See Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro Lorenti, Argentina vs. ICSID: Unconstitu-
tionality of the BITs and ICSID Jurisdiction-the Potential New Government De-fenses Against the Enforcement of the ICSID Arbitral Award-Issues That May
Subject the Award to Revision by the Argentine Judiciary, (Alfaro-Abogados 2005),
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=32539.
146. Id. (internal citations omitted).
147. CMS Gas, Case No. ARB/01/8, 28, supra note 141.
148. Id. 50.
149. Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [TSJ], 17/8/1999, File No. 812-829, http://
www.tsj.gov.ve/jurisprudencia/CP/cpl7081999-812-829.html.
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Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.' 150 Venezuela's move to exert more
control over foreign oil companies operating in its territory (including
BP, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Total and Stat Oil) suggested
possible new waves of ICSID cases. 151 Venezuela, along with Bolivia and
Nicaragua, will no longer participate in ICSID. At the recent President's
Summit for the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a leftist
trade bloc, Venezuela "'emphatically" reject[ed] the impositions and
pressures from "transnational companies that ... resist the application of
decisions by their countries' sovereign governments. These companies
rather threaten to initiate international legal proceedings and arbitration
processes using mechanisms such as the ICSID.' 152
These attacks on international arbitration, along with Argentina's wa-
vering attitude towards international arbitration, signal a regional trend
in the interference with the autonomy of arbitration. Argentina, Vene-
zuela and other developing nations, however, must consider the risk
calculus in deciding whether to comply with ICSID or not. Despite IC-
SID's aforementioned enforcement drawbacks, a state's non-compliance
may lead to a loss of its credibility in the international business commu-
nity. Moreover, as a member of the World Bank family, ICSID enjoys a
distinct advantage over the New York Convention enforcement mecha-
nisms: the possibility of withdrawal of official World Bank and IMF aid,
150. See Venezuela Turns Away From Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Mar. 2, 2007,
http://www.gobalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/3717/venezuela-turns-away-
arbitration/.
151. On May 1, 2007, BP, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, France's Total, and Norway's Stat Oil
agreed-in principle-to hand over 60 percent of their assets to PDVSA. The
companies have until June 26, 2007 to negotiate the terms of the new contracts.
Eni-Daci6n, an oil company operating in Venezuela's Orinoco belt, has registered
a billion-dollar claim against Venezuela at ICSID. See Venezuelan Oil Companies
Face Moment of Truth, GLOBAL ARB. REV., May 4, 2007, http://www.gobalarbitra-
tionreview.com/news/article/3794/venezuelan-oil-companies-face-moment-truth/.
152. See Withdrawal from ICSID, supra note 22. Simply withdrawing from ICSID does
not necessarily close the door on facing expropriation cases. Indeed, a number of
other treaties, including BITs, would need to be revised or reversed for Venezuela,
Bolivia, or Nicaragua to enjoy an ICSID-free future. In addition, many of the
investment treaties have survival clauses, which allow for further claims. Accord-
ingly, Bolivia intends to renegotiate its BITs one at a time, as they expire. Id.
Many of Bolivia's BITs are in force for 10 years, after which either coun-
try can choose to end the treaty. If the original 10-year period elapses
without notice to terminate, then the BIT remains in force in one of two
ways. Some BITs are renewed for 6 or 10-year periods and can only be
terminated if notice is given in advance of the end of one of those peri-
ods. Other BITs, such as the Bolivia-United States agreement are re-
newed indefinitely and can be terminated at any time after the initial 10-
year time-span, given one year's notice.
[M]ost of Bolivia's BITs also contain ... survival clause[s], which ensure
that most of the protections offered in the BIT will continue to apply to
investments made prior to the termination of the treaty, for 10 to 20
years after that termination date. Bolivia Notifies World Bank of With-
drawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS,
May 9, 2007, 1 7-8, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=
8221.
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especially in the form of largely subsidized funds.153
3. The Need for a Full-Time Leader
As previously noted, despite ICSID's growing caseload, ICSID has not
changed structurally since its creation forty years ago. Indeed, ICSID re-
mains small, staffed by about a dozen lawyers, with the general counsel of
the World Bank serving as its part-time Secretary-General. 154 Conse-
quently, ICSID has struggled to maintain an efficient, highly technical
investor-state arbitration process.1 55 Commentators question whether
ICSID "has the financial backing, governmental support and 'ICSID-ar-
bitration focused' senior management required to fulfill its growing
responsibilities."1 56
Although the ICSID Convention dictates how to operate ICSID, some
things are flexible, including how ICSID is financed. Currently the World
Bank provides ICSID's budget largely as a matter of convenience. 157 The
exact mechanism provided by the Convention (requiring direct contribu-
tions from contracting states, linked to fractions of other contributions) 158
may be difficult to implement. Still, there could be room for maneuver.
Likewise, the only apparent limit to the Secretariat's size, including ad-
ministrative staff, is ICSID's present budget, which is rather small com-
pared to the bank's overall group.
ICSID and the World Bank are linked in other ways. The ICSID Con-
vention gives the president of the World Bank key roles in certain situa-
tions, such as challenges to ICSID tribunal arbitrators. Also, the bank's
general counsel traditionally serves as ICSID's Secretary-General. 59
This connection is useful in that it ensures a hot line to the president of
the World Bank.160 ICSID's affiliation with the World Bank also lends
credibility in the eyes of the contracting states. But, there is a downside.
ICSID's titular head has by definition another more important job; he or
she can only ever give ICSID attention part-time. Yet it seems self-evi-
dent that ICSID should have an executive managing it full-time. For
many years, the general counsel or Secretary-General had the luxury of
being able to delegate to Antonio Parra, ICSID's deputy director, who
became ICSID's de facto manager in 2000.161 Parra ran the daily details,
but kept his executive in the loop. Parra, however, left in 2005. Since
153. See Ibrahim F. I. Shiata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Dis-
putes: The Roles ofICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1,
115-16 (1986). See generally Stewart Shackleton, Footing the Bill, LEGAL WEEK
GLOBAL, Jan. 24, 2003 (stating that investments covered by international law and
BITs include most forms of business assets that foreign investors may undertake).
154. Rowley, supra note 5, at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See David Samuels & James Clasper, ICSID Deserves a Full-Time Leader, 1
GLOBAL ARB. REV. 12 (2006).
158. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, regulation 18.
159. Samuels, supra note 157, at 12.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 14.
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION REVISED
then, Margrete Stevens has played the senior internal role. "ICSID users
seem impressed with Stevens, whom they find knowledgeable, diplomatic
and above all a good manager. But in the sense of job titles, since Parra
left there has been a vacuum to fill." '162
III. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES
In 1976, the UNCITRAL issued the Model International Commercial
Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Rules).1 63 The UNCITRAL Rules are
intended to be acceptable in countries with different legal, social and eco-
nomic systems.1 64 The UNCITRAL Rules are widely used in both ad hoc
arbitrations as well as administered arbitrations. 165 Indeed, unlike the
ICSID Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules are not identified with any national
or international arbitration organization. Parties to a contract may agree
to use the UNCITRAL Rules to guide the resolution of commercial dis-
putes arising between them. Nothing in the Rules limits their use to na-
tionals of states that are member states of the Commission or even to
members of the United Nations.1 66
Among other things, the UNCITRAL rules provide that an "ap-
pointing authority" shall be chosen by the parties or, if they fail to agree
upon that point, shall be chosen by the Secretary-General of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration at the Hague (comprised of a body of persons
prepared to act as arbitrators if requested). 167 The UNCITRAL Rules
also cover notice requirements, representation of the parties, challenges
of arbitrators, evidence, hearings, the place of arbitration, language,
statements of claims and defenses, pleas to the arbitrator's jurisdiction,
162. Id.
163. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 2. UNCITRAL was established by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1966. In establishing the Commission, the General Assembly
recognized "that disparities in national laws governing international trade created
obstacles to the flow of trade," and it regarded the Commission "as the vehicle by
which the United Nations could play a more active role in reducing or removing
these obstacles." See Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html.
164. See G.A. Res. 31/98, IT 3-5, U.N. Doc A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976). Developing
countries often favor the Rules because of the care with which they have been
drafted, and because UNCITRAL was a forum for developing arbitration rules
where their concerns would be heard. The UNCITRAL Rules have inspired do-
mestic legislation on arbitration and have been successfully used to resolve numer-
ous private commercial disputes. See Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial
Arbitration: Americanized, "Civilized," or Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 35 (2003).
165. For example, the London Court of Arbitration has worked with the UNCITRAL
Rules. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal also used the UNCITRAL Rules
in dealing with claims arising out of the confrontation between the two countries in
1980. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Repub-
lic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20
I.L.M. 257, arts. II and 111(2) (1981).
166. See FAQ-UNCITRAL and Private Disputes/Litigation, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration-faq.html.
167. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 2, art. 6.
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provisional remedies, experts, default, rule waivers, the form and effect of
the award, applicable law, settlement, interpretation of the award and
costs.
In addition to its 1976 Model Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL has also
promulgated a 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion.168 Under the Model Law, submission to arbitration may be ad hoc
for a particular dispute, but is accomplished most often in advance of the
dispute by a general submission clause within a contract. Legislation
based on the Model Law has been enacted in forty-six jurisdictions, and
eight states of the United States: California, Connecticut, Florida, Geor-
gia, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas. 169
A. CHANGES To THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES
The UNCITRAL Rules, which have been in force since their adoption
by UNCITRAL and the United Nations General Assembly in 1976, were
not specifically tailored to resolve investor-state disputes or entertain
claims for breach of customary or conventional international law. 170
From a procedural perspective, disputes to which a state is a party involve
questions of law or public interest that are distinct from an arbitration
between private commercial parties. Indeed, the very presence of a state
as a party in a dispute raises a public interest because nationals and re-
sidents of that state have an interest in how the government acts during
the arbitration and in the outcome of the arbitration. Moreover, the exis-
tence of this public interest has direct implications for the conduct of the
arbitration: good governance and accountability in a democratic society
require that government activities be transparent and open to public
participation. 171
Also, many state arbitrations (especially those arising under investment
protection treaties), by definition, involve direct allegations of govern-
ment misconduct. The public interest, in knowing what the allegations,
facts and outcome are, is self-evident. Finally, an increasing number of
state arbitrations raise profoundly important issues of public policy that
deeply affect domestic decision-making processes. To illustrate, impor-
tant public policy issues raised in recent investor-state arbitrations in-
168. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 24 I.L.M.
1302 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. The aim was to provide a set
of rules that would be acceptable worldwide, and which could be progressively
adopted by national legislators. See G.A. Res. 40/72, 40 GAOR Supp. No. 53,
U.N. Doc A/40/53 (Dec. 11, 1985).
169. See Status 1985- UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/1985Modelar-
bitrationstatus.html. Connecticut enacted the Model Law's full text without
changes except for the addition of article 37, which states: "This Act may be cited
as the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration." 1989
Conn. Pub. Acts 89-179.
170. Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules refers only to "disputes in relation to [a]
contract."
171. Barry Leon & John Terry, Special Considerations When a State is a Party to Inter-
national Arbitration, 61 APR Disp. RESOL. J. 69, 72-74 (2006).
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clude challenges relating to drinking water supply systems, hazardous
waste sites, and taxes on high fructose corn syrup.172
This public interest difference between state and commercial arbitra-
tions has direct implications for the conduct of the arbitration. For exam-
ple, there may be a need for particular procedural arrangements, such as
separate phases on jurisdiction and admissibility before the submission of
a statement of claim, amicus curiae briefs, and consolidation of claims
and hearings. 173 Although some BITs empower arbitral tribunals to
amend the UNCITRAL Rules as necessary, or directly set forth particu-
lar procedures derogating from or supplementing the Rules, under the
vast majority of BITs, parties and tribunals have to look for guidance
outside the text of the UNCITRAL Rules in relation to such issues.
Accordingly, UNCITRAL agreed to give priority to the revision of its
arbitration rules in July 2006, and began work on revising the rules in
September 2006 in Vienna, Austria. 174 The following analysis considers
the main provisions in the UNCITRAL Rules that could significantly im-
pact investor-state arbitrations.
1. Article 1(1): Scope of Application
Article 1(1) apparently limits the scope of the UNCITRAL Rules to
"disputes in relation to [a] contract."'1 75 Clearly, however, the UNCI-
TRAL Rules have been used, and will continue to be used, in investment
disputes that either do not relate to a contract at all, 176 or relate to a
contract involving a person that is not a party in the arbitration. 177
Therefore, Paulsson & Petrochilos in their 2006 report, which was com-
missioned by the UNCITRAL Secretariat as part of an initiative to spur
discussion on the revision of the UNCITRAL Rules, proposed that the
contractual dispute limitation be eliminated. 178 Indeed, the law of the
arbitration should govern the arbitrability of a dispute, and there is noth-
ing on the face of the UNCITRAL Rules to suggest that they are not
suitable for the resolution of non-contractual disputes.1 79 The elimina-
172. Id. 70-1, 73-74.
173. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 6.
174. See Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its
forty-sixth session, A/CN.9/619.
175. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
176. See, e.g., Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States (2006), http://
www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/ThunderbirdlThunderbird-Award.pdf. (in-
volving a dispute on the withdrawal of a license under an investment treaty).
177. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (2001) (partial award), http://
investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-PartiaAward-13Sept2001.pdf;
Lauder v. Czech Republic (2001) (final award), http://www.investmentclaims.com/
decisions/Lauder-Czech-FinalAward-3Sept200l.pdf.
178. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 35. Consistent with article 1(1), provision
should be made in article 3(3)(d) for disputes that do not arise "out of or in rela-
tion to" a contract.
179. See Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom 8 (2000), quoted at 6.2 of the Award (2001),
which concerned a dispute about the alleged unlawful imposition of American mu-
nicipal laws over claimant's person within the territorial jurisdiction of Hawaii.
The tribunal stated: "When regard is had to the non-prescriptive and non-coercive
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tion of the contractual dispute limitation, moreover, would be consistent
with article 7(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which permits arbitra-
tion of disputes "in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether con-
tractual or not," and ICSID.180
2. Article 1(2)
Article 1(2) makes clear that the application of the UNCITRAL Rules
is subject to the controlling national arbitration law (the lex arbitri) of a
particular dispute.18 1 The Rules neither define which law is the control-
ling law, nor the provisions of the mandatory, (public law that parties
cannot avoid by contract) provisions of that law. The arbitral tribunal
generally resolves these issues. Yet it is often assumed that law can only
be the law of a given state (ordinarily the law of the juridical seat of the
arbitration), as opposed to public international law. Although this is
valid in the vast majority of cases, including UNCITRAL arbitrations
under BITs or NAFTA, where a state or international organization is in-
volved as an arbitrating party, the assumption is not always true. This
uncertainty actually caused significant problems for the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal. 182 The Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Re-
port, therefore, proposed that article 1(2) explicitly refer to "international
law" thus enabling a tribunal to entertain claims for breach of customary
or conventional international law. 183
3. Article 2: Notice, calculation of periods of time
Article 2 of the UNICTRAL Rules does not deal with service on states.
In practice, claimants initiating arbitrations against states variously serve
Notices of Arbitration to the respondent state's Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, the head of the government, other ministries, an ambassador of the
respondent state, or autonomous state agencies. This practice, however,
is incoherent, is prone to cause confusion, and does not assist states in
nature of the UNCITRAL Rules as a standard regime available for parties to ap-
ply to resolve disputes between them, however, there appears no reason why the
UNCITRAL Rules cannot be adapted to apply to a non-contractual dispute." The
tribunal then provided several examples where the UNCITRAL Rules could be
applied-the parties could agree that a dispute as to tort, or occupier's or environ-
mental liability might be determined in an arbitration applying the UNCITRAL
Rules. The parties could also agree to apply the UNCITRAL Rules to a dispute
that had already arisen independently of any contractual relationship between
them-disputing parties can specifically or by implication adopt or apply the UN-
CITRAL Rules to any dispute. Id.
180. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 168.
181. Again, legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law (especially article 34
dealing with recourse against an arbitral award) has been enacted in 46 jurisdic-
tions worldwide, and eight states of the United States. Note that article 34 states
that an application to set aside an award is the only available challenge against an
international arbitral award and is similar in most respects to the language in the
ICSID Convention governing Annulment Committee review. See ICSID Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art.52.
182. See UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, IT 37-8.
183. See UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 39.
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receiving notice of proceedings in a timely fashion. The Paulsson & Pe-
trochilos UNCITRAL Report, therefore, proposed a revision of article 2
to clarify that a state is sufficiently notified of arbitral proceedings initi-
ated against it if notice is delivered to an organ of that state, capable of
receiving service, under its laws. 1 84 Note that some of the more recent
FTAs concluded by the United States, such as CAFTA-DR, explicitly list
the government entity of each Party that is to be notified, in large part to
resolve the confusion that arises when arbitration is administered under
the UNCITRAL rule 5.185
4. Article 3: Notice of arbitration
Pursuant to article 3(1), the party initiating recourse to arbitration is
required to give to the other party a notice of arbitration. Nothing in
article 3, however, requires that the notice of arbitration be made known
to the public. The current lack of a public register for arbitral proceed-
ings involving a state as a party appears to be in direct conflict with dem-
ocratic principles of good governance. Specifically, the public has a right
to know about the initiation and thus the existence of an arbitral proceed-
ing. Yet the Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report is silent regard-
ing the need for a public register.1 86 Nevertheless, the Center for
International Environmental Law (CIEL) and the International Institute
for Sustainable Development (IISD), have argued that a copy of the no-
tice of arbitration and the agreement on the composition of the tribunal
should be transmitted to the UNCITRAL Secretariat, which would then
post both documents on the UNCITRAL website.1 87 This would bring
the UNCITRAL Rules in line with other rules and processes, such as
those under ICSID, pursuant to which a public register of all arbitrations
is already maintained. Similarly, the WTO systematically posts requests
for consultation and the subsequent requests for establishment of a panel
on its website. 188
184. Id. at 91 43.
185. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 127, art. 10.16.
186. There may be strong opposition to a public registry in the international business/
arbitration community. Indeed, one of the traditional advantages of UNCITRAL
over ICSID arbitration is that it is theoretically possible to keep the entire pro-
ceedings secret.
187. The Center for International Environmental Law and the International Institute
for Sustainable Development submitted a joint paper to UNCITRAL aimed at
increasing transparency, accountability and public participation in investor-state
arbitration. See CENTRE FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW & INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., REVISING THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO ADDRESS STATE AR-
BITRATIONS 7 (2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment-revisinguncitral_
arbitration.pdf [hereinafter NGO Report]. Both organizations were granted ob-
server status to the International Arbitration and Conciliation Working Group,
charged with revising the UNCITRAL Rules, at the 46th Group Session in Febru-
ary 2007. Their submissions will not have a direct effect on discussions, but will be
considered once an agreed set of revisions exists. NGOs enfranchised at UNCI-
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5. Article 15(1): General Provisions
Procedural flexibility is the primary advantage of international arbitra-
tion; the format and timetable of the arbitral proceedings can be tailor-
made to the circumstances of each particular case. Accordingly, article
15(1) expressly permits the arbitral tribunal to "conduct the arbitration in
such manner as it considers appropriate," provided that each party re-
ceives equal treatment and a full opportunity to present its case, as speci-
fied in article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 189
Article 15(1), however, does not dictate the tribunal's duty to ensure
that arbitral proceedings are not unnecessarily delayed (another advan-
tage of international arbitration is the speed of the arbitral process in
contrast to international business litigation), 190 nor does it delineate the
power of arbitral tribunals to issue directions in that regard.
The Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report, therefore, proposed
a revised text of article 15(1) that obligates the tribunal to take all steps
necessary for an expeditious and efficient resolution of the dispute, and
issue appropriate directions to the parties. The parties must also co-oper-
ate with (or among) each other and with the tribunal, including compli-
ance with its directions. "Failure to do so may be taken into account by
the arbitral tribunal in allocating the costs of the arbitration pursuant to
article 40."191
6. New Article 15(2)-(3)
Preparatory meetings, which can be held to decide on the schedule and
format of the proceedings, when witnesses will be heard, and when the
tribunal considers the appointment of one or more experts, etc., are in-
creasingly viewed as serving a useful purpose, particularly in more com-
plex international arbitration proceedings. Indeed, preparatory meetings
are expressly provided for under article 21(1) of the ICSID Rules. While
current article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules does not preclude tribu-
nals from holding preparatory meetings, the Paulsson & Petrochilos UN-
CITRAL Report proposed the inclusion of an express provision enabling
the arbitral tribunal to hold meetings regarding points at issue, settlement
negotiations, etc.192 This provision would more closely reflect general in-
ternational arbitration practice.
7. New Article 15(4)
Disputes occasionally arise between parties under separate contracts
containing separate arbitration clauses that pose similar questions of law
or fact. Additionally, for tactical reasons, parties often initiate multiple
arbitrations with distinct claims arising under the same contract. Consoli-
189. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 2. art. 15(1).
190. Article 14(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, however, cautions against the failure
of an arbitrator "to act without undue delay."
191. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 119.
192. Id. at s 124.
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dation, therefore, would ensure an efficient resolution of disputes be-
tween parties, and is consistent with article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL
Rules. Consolidation would also reduce the possibility of inconsistent
awards in parallel arbitrations.
Currently, consolidation is possible only where the parties agree.
Moreover, article 19(3) states that the respondent can only bring a coun-
terclaim "arising out of the same contract. '193 Yet there is no reason why
counterclaims should be restricted to those that arise out of the same
contract, especially in light of the modern trend to arbitrate several dif-
ferent kinds of non-contractual disputes under the UNICTRAL Rules.
Accordingly, the Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report pro-
posed a provision for consolidation based on NAFTA article 1126(2),
which would allow for consolidation of claims involving the same par-
ties. 194 This provision will help promote the fair and efficient resolution
of claims and encourage parties to resolve disputes in the same
proceedings. 195
8. New Article 15(5)
The UNCITRAL Rules are silent regarding a tribunal's ability to ac-
cept and consider amicus curiae briefs. Article 15(1), however, has been
held to confer the power on the tribunal to accept amicus briefs in written
form.196 The Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report proposed that
an explicit provision allowing arbitral tribunals to accept amicus briefs be
included in the UNCITRAL Rules "[ejspecially in light of the frequent
use of the UNCITRAL Rules in arbitrations under international invest-
ment treaties. '197
Arbitral tribunals, in deciding whether to accept amicus curiae briefs,
must consider whether the case involves significant issues of public inter-
est that might benefit from third party participation, whether amicus sub-
missions would assist the tribunal in the determination of a factual or
legal issue, and whether the non-disputing party has a significant and le-
gitimate interest in the dispute. It is unclear, however, how the tribunal
193. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 2, art. 19(3).
194. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 131. NAFTA article 1126(2) not only dem-
onstrates that consolidation is feasible in ad hoc arbitration under the UNCI-
TRAL Rules, but actually goes so far as to permit consolidations even when the
parties are not the same.
195. Id. at 131. Justification for consolidation under the UNCITRAL Rules is also
found in the ICC Rules. Pursuant to ICC rule 4(6), consolidation is allowed when
all proceedings relate to the same "legal relationship," on the premise that the
parties have consented to give the tribunal the power to consolidate claims by
choosing to arbitrate in accordance with the ICC Rules. Id. at 1 129.
196. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, 47 (2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/
USA/Methanex/MethanexDecisionReAuthorityAmicus.pdf. See also United Par-
cel Serv. of America Inc. v. Gov. of Canada, 72 (2001). The tribunal followed
the Methanex decision, but added that "[t]he circumstances and the detail of the
making of any amicus submissions would be the subject of consultation with the
parties." Id.
197. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, T 133.
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would deal with potentially dozens of amicus briefs in a particular case.
Consequently, it should be clarified whether the tribunal can limit the
number of amicus submissions.
Unlike the revised rule 37(2) of ICSID, which allows tribunals to ac-
cept amicus briefs, with or without the consent of the parties, new article
15(5) only allows for amicus participation if the parties have not agreed
otherwise. 198 This seems inconsistent with the concept of a friend of the
court that serves to provide useful information to the tribunal, while leav-
ing it up to the tribunal to determine how to use that information.
9. New Article 15ter
Articles 25(4) and 32(5) of the UNCITRAL Rules deal with confiden-
tiality of hearings and awards respectively, but there are no rules regard-
ing the confidentiality of the proceedings as such or of the materials
(including pleadings) before the tribunal. 199 Thus the Paulsson & Pe-
trochilos UNCITRAL Report proposed an explicit provision on confi-
dentiality that any materials used in the arbitration are confidential, with
an exception for the submission of amicus briefs, to conform to revised
article 15(5).200
While an explicit confidentiality rule might be useful in commercial dis-
putes between private parties, the CIEL and IISD argue that such a rule
is completely inappropriate in investor-state arbitrations since it prevents
a government from making its own submissions available to the public,
which is contrary to principles of good governance.20 1
Further, access to documents produced in the arbitration is necessary
to operationalize provisions regarding amicus submissions. For ex-
ample, a non-disputing party requesting leave to submit an amicus
brief to a tribunal could not elaborate on whether its perspective,
knowledge or insight is different from the disputing parties' or useful
to the tribunal, if the record remains secret. [Likewise, a non-disput-
ing party could not] prepare a submission within the scope of the
when access to pleadings is denied.20 2
The CIEL and IISD, in support of their proposal, cite the NAFTA Par-
ties' July 30, 2001 Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provi-
198. ICSID revised rule 37 permits a tribunal to allow amicus participation without the
approval of one or both of the arbitrating parties. While rule 37(2) requires a
tribunal to consult with the parties, it does not allow either or both parties together
to veto a decision by a tribunal. See ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra
note 1, rule 37.
199. Although the current UNCITRAL Rules are silent with respect to the confidenti-
ality of the materials produced during the proceedings, current article 15(3) (incor-
porated by the Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report in new article 15BIS)
addresses a related issue: "All documents or information supplied to the arbitral
tribunal by one party shall at the same time be communicated by that party to the
other party." UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 143.
200. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 11 147, 148.
201. NGO Report, supra note 187, at 10.
202. Id. at 10.
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sions, which states that NAFTA does not impose a general duty of
confidentiality on parties to a chapter 11 dispute, and that the parties are
not precluded from providing public access to documents submitted to, or
issued by, a chapter 11 tribunal.20 3 The interpretation also requires
NAFTA parties to make all documents publicly available "in a timely
manner," subject to certain protections for confidential business and in-
formation that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under
a party's domestic law.20 4
Additionally, every subsequent BIT and FTA negotiated by the United
States expressly provides for the transparency of the arbitration, includ-
ing access to documents in arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules.
For example, article 29 of the United States-Uruguay BIT, concluded in
2004, requires open hearings and non-confidential materials. 20 5 Finally,
in addition to panel and Appellate Body rulings, the WTO generally
makes several documents available to the public on its website, including
the request for consultation and the subsequent request for establishment
of a panel, the notification of appeal, and status reports (but not the
briefs and other pleadings).
10. Article 25(4): Evidence and Hearings
Current article 25(4) provides that arbitral hearings must be held in
camera unless the parties agree otherwise. In certain cases, however, it
could be useful to open hearings to persons other than those directly in-
volved in the proceedings, as in arbitrations where a state is a party to the
dispute. Indeed, open hearings would provide the public with greater
transparency of arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules. 20 6
Accordingly, the Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report pro-
posed that article 25(4) be clarified to give the tribunal the power, after
consulting the disputing parties, to allow third parties to attend hearings
and to issue directions for the protection of proprietary or privileged in-
formation. This power would be particularly relevant when the tribunal
decides to receive amicus submissions pursuant to the proposed revision
203. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter Eleven Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade
Commission, §§ A1-A2a, July 31, 2001 http://www.alfait.gc.ca/tna-nac/Nafta-Inter-
en.asp.
204. Id. § A2b (providing exceptions for '(i) confidential business information; (ii) in-
formation which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under law;"
and (iii) information must be withheld pursuant to relevant arbitral rules). The
interpretation also provides exceptions under NAFTA articles 2101 (national se-
curity) and 2105 (information that would impede law enforcement or affect per-
sonal privacy) in section A3.
205. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ment, U.S.-Uru., Oct. 25, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/BIT/Uru-
guay/SectionIndex.html. Note that Mexico, unlike the United States and Canada,
never agreed in NAFTA to public hearings. There are probably many other gov-
ernments that would object to this degree of transparency. Indeed, in WTO dis-
putes most of the hearings other than those in which the parties are Canada, the
United States, and the European Union are still closed.
206. NGO Report, supra note 187, at 8.
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of article 15(5) of the UNCITRAL Rules, and would be consistent with
ICSID. As noted above, ICSID revised rule 32(2) allows the arbitral tri-
bunal to permit persons besides the parties, their agents to attend the
hearings or even open them to the public, without the consent of both
parties, provided it considers the views of the disputing parties and con-
suits with the Secretariat. In addition, the revised rule 32(2) requires the
tribunal, when necessary, to prescribe procedures to protect proprietary
information and make the appropriate logistical arrangements. 20 7
11. Article 32(5)
Current article 32(5) provides that an award can only be publicized
with the consent of the disputing parties. Consequently, a state must seek
and obtain approval from the foreign investor to publish the award. A
private party can thus block the publication of an award against the will
of a state party and vice-versa. This provision seems out-of-date. 20 8
The Paulsson & Petrochilos UNCITRAL Report, therefore, proposed
a revised text of article 32(5), which would allow the publication of an
award "with the consent of the parties" or where a party must disclose an
award because of a legal duty, "to protect or pursue a legal right or in
relation to other [bona fide] legal proceedings. ' 20 9 This rule would be
consistent with the ICSID revised rules, which do not require the consent
of the parties for the publication of arbitral awards. Indeed, ICSID must
"promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the
Tribunal," 210 even when parties do not agree to the publication of the
award by ICSID. The same language is also used in ICSID's Additional
Facility Rules.211 UNCITRAL, however, has no secretariat to oversee
arbitrations and thus an approach that would require the publication of
excerpts of the tribunal's legal reasoning is probably unavailable.
B. CONCLUSION
The challenge for UNCITRAL has been to revise its rules to more ac-
curately reflect the great advances in arbitral practice that have occurred
since their promulgation, while ensuring that the Rules continue to meet
the needs of their users, reflecting best practice in the field of interna-
tional arbitration. Although the proposed revisions are incremental, they
207. Noteworthy, the BITs and FIAs the United States has negotiated with Chile, Sin-
gapore, Uruguay, Peru and Columbia, and the Central American countries, which
all provide for investment arbitration, including under the UNCITRAL Rules, re-
quire open hearings in the conduct of the arbitration. For example, the US-Chile
FFA provides that, "[t]he tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public and
shall determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate logisti-
cal arrangements." See Chile FTA, supra note 80, art. 10.20(2). In addition to open
hearings, the treaty provides that the respondent shall make available to the public
the minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal. Id. art. 10.20(1)(d).
208. NGO Report, supra note 187, at 6.
209. UNCITRAL Report, supra note 11, 1 255.
210. ICSID Convention, Arbitration Rules, supra note 1, rule 48(4).
211. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 4, art. 53(3).
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reflect a growing trend in investor-state arbitration towards increased
transparency and public participation. Obviously, the real effect of these
proposed reforms on investor-state arbitration will depend on how they
are written and implemented in practice. Nevertheless, they are more in
line with other arbitral rules and processes, such as those under ICSID.
Investors and corporate counsel are well advised to keep informed about
these developments as they consider investor-state arbitration as a means
of resolving disputes with government entities.
IV. CONCLUSION
As explained earlier, the number of investor-state arbitrations adminis-
tered by ICSID, or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules has in-
creased dramatically, resulting in a growing body of international
investment law. This growth is largely the result of the proliferation of
bilateral commitments to encourage foreign direct investment and FTAs
at the bilateral, regional and interregional level containing consents, on
the part of the States concerned, to the ICSID Convention, the Addi-
tional Facility Arbitration, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. This
trend seems certain to continue, given the very large and still growing
number of treaties with such consents. Indeed, many countries, including
the United States, have pushed to open trade markets with sub-regions or
individual countries since the Doha debacle, where the 148 member
countries of the WTO failed to agree to a multilateral trading system.
Accordingly, both ICSID and UNCITRAL have implemented or are in
the process of implementing reforms to their rules. Although the changes
are incremental, they reflect a growing trend in investor-state arbitration
towards increased transparency and public participation, and (in the case
of ICSID) a greater willingness to draw inspiration from litigation based
models of dispute resolution. Obviously, the real effect of these reforms
on investor-state arbitration will depend on how they are written and im-
plemented in practice. Still, these reforms represent an important step
forward in addressing modern arbitral realities and ensuring their contin-
ued relevance in the field of international arbitration.
ICSID, however, must further respond to the many changing demands
on the institution. ICSID must change its governing structure in order to
maintain an efficient, highly technical investor-state arbitration process.
ICSID must be more adequately staffed and funded, and have ICSID-
arbitration focused senior management. Although the ICSID Conven-
tion dictates how to operate ICSID, some things are flexible, and these
changes can be made consistent with the Convention. If these changes
are not made investors may start to abandon ICSID for another less-bur-
densome arbitral system.
As this article has tried to show, moreover, many Latin American juris-
dictions have recently threatened the autonomy of international arbitra-
tion, and have even withdrawn from ICSID itself (no government had
formally withdrawn from ICSID until now). It is unclear how ICSID will
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respond and whether ICSID can do anything at all. Remember, ICSID
like all other international bodies lacks institutional remedies against
non-complying states and must rely on contracting states to enforce an
award within the framework of their national laws on sovereign immunity
and existing treaty obligations. As such, investors and corporate counsel
are well advised to keep informed about these developments as they con-
sider investor-state arbitration, administered pursuant to the Convention,
as a means of resolving disputes with government entities. Even if state
measures impair investment rights thereby crippling an investors' ability
to do business in a given state, ICSID claims may be foreclosed and
unavailable.
